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Why do some oil exporters experience civil
war but others do not?: investigating the
conditional effects of oil
MATTH IA S BA S EDAU AND THOMAS R ICHTER*
GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg, Germany
According to quantitative studies, oil seems the only natural resource that is robustly linked
to civil war onset. However, recent debates on the nexus of oil and internal conﬂict have
neglected the fact that there are a number of peaceful rentier oil states in existence. Few
efforts have been made to explain why some oil-exporting countries have experienced
civil war while others have not. We thus address this puzzle, by arguing that civil war risks
depend on the speciﬁc conditions of oil production and how they come to structure state–
society relations. Speciﬁcally, we expect that states that are either highly dependent on oil or
who have problematic relations with oil regions are prone to civil war. However, these
risks will be mitigated either when democratic institutions can manage conﬂicts peacefully
or when abundant oil revenues can be spent in such a way as to buy peace. We test this
conditional argument by comparing 39 net oil exporters, using a (crisp-set) Qualitative
Comparative Analysis – a methodology particularly suited to test conditional relationships
in medium-N samples. Our results largely conﬁrm our conditional hypotheses. Conditions
of oil production are ambiguous, and particular combinations thus explain the onset of
civil war. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that high abundance is sufﬁcient to ensure peace, while
two distinct pathways lead to civil war: the combination of high dependence and low
abundance, as well as the overlap of ethnic exclusion and oil reserves in non-abundant
and non-democratic oil states.
Keywords: oil; civil war; csQCA; ethnic exclusion; political institutions
Introduction
According to the existing quantitative literature, oil seems to be robustly linked to
the onset of civil war (Ross, 2004a; Dixon, 2009). However, recent debates on the
nexus of oil and internal conﬂict1 have overlooked the existence of a number of
peaceful rentier oil states. Only very few convincing efforts have been made to
explain why some oil-exporting countries lapse into violence but others do not. In
this paper, we address this puzzle by arguing that the onset of civil war depends on
the speciﬁc conditions of oil production. We claim that some features of oil
* E-mail: thomas.richter@giga-hamburg.de
1 Unless otherwise indicated, civil war denotes an armed conﬂict (UCDP/PRIO deﬁnition) that has
produced at least 1000 battle-related deaths in a given year (see Gleditsch et al., 2002).
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production increase the risk of civil war while others reduce these hazards,
depending on how these conditions structure state–society relations. Speciﬁcally, we
argue that states that are either highly dependent on oil or who have problematic
relations with local oil regions are prone to civil war. However, these risks will be
muted when conﬂict is ﬁltered through democratic institutions or when states can
use abundant oil revenues to buy peace. Empirically, we compare 39 net oil-
exporting countries using (crisp-set) Qualitative Comparative Analysis (csQCA), a
technique that is best used to study the conditional relationships between different
factors for samples of between 10 and 50 cases.
This paper makes three contributions to the existing literature on civil war. First,
we propose a conditional explanation for the enigma of why some oil producers are
prone to civil war but others are not, a theoretical approach that has been rarely
applied in the study of the oil–conﬂict link; second, with the aid of this explanation,
we point to the ambiguous nature of oil production, which depends on the mix of
conﬂict risks and mitigating conditions; and, third, we suggest that there are several
simultaneous pathways that lead to civil war and to peace.
The paper proceeds as follows: ﬁrst, we review the literature on the resource–
conﬂict link, showing that the enigma of why some oil-exporting countries experi-
ence civil war while others do not is still unresolved. Subsequently, we develop
our hypothesis that certain conditions of oil production make states conﬂict
prone, although democratic institutions and high abundance may offset these
risks. We then outline an empirical strategy, introducing csQCA, followed by the
operationalizations of our ‘outcome’ – civil war onset – and our ‘conditions’ – (oil)
dependence, overlap (of ethnic exclusion and oil reserves), (oil) abundance and
democracy. Conditional relationships between these different aspects are then
tested using a sample of 39 net oil exporters between 1970 and 2008. We after-
wards perform the analysis and discuss the results. We also point to a number
of important model speciﬁcations, in order to underline the reliability of our
main results. Finally, we draw relevant conclusions and highlight our contribu-
tion to the current debate about the determinants of civil war within resource-
endowed countries.
Previous research on the oil–conﬂict link
Collier and Hoefﬂer’s (2004; initially 1998) inﬂuential pioneering work on
‘greed and grievance’ has inspired many subsequent studies on the link between
natural resources and violent conﬂict. Collier and Hoefﬂer argue that the ratio of
primary commodities to GDP increases the likelihood of civil war by providing the
opportunity for armed rebel activity and the related motive of ‘greed’, rather than
by spurring conﬂict-promoting grievances – such as the political and economic
deprivation experienced by, for instance, ethnic or religious groups. These ideas
have since been further developed in the literature. Generally, natural resources can
promote violence through three major causal mechanisms (see also Ross, 2004b;
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Humphreys, 2005; Le Billon, 2008) (1)motivation to take up arms may result from
resource-related grievances, such as ecological damage or the withholding of
resource revenues; the costs and beneﬁts related to resources are the driving forces
of conﬂict; (2) resources also provide the opportunity for conﬂict by making
rebellion or warfare ﬁnancially (or militarily) feasible, particularly through the
‘lootability’ of resources; (3) resources may make indirect mechanisms work
by providing neither motive nor opportunity directly, but by exerting instead a
detrimental inﬂuence on other areas – such as state institutions (the ‘weak state’)
and socio-economic development – which in turn makes civil war more likely.
Numerous quantitative studies have tried to demonstrate that natural resources
increase the risk of civil war onset, with varying results. Ross (2004a) analyzed
14 quantitative studies of the resource–conﬂict link, ﬁnding that primary commodities
as awhole cannot be robustly linked to either civil war onset or duration. According to
his conclusions, only oil-exporting countries seem to be particularly prone to
civil war onset. This ﬁnding is supported by a meta analysis conducted by Dixon
(2009). Ross (2012) argues that oil’s conﬂict curse derives from speciﬁc ‘troubles
with oil’: oil-related grievances over revenue distribution both inside and outside of
oil-producing regions create incentives for secessionist and other conﬂicts; or, alter-
natively, the prospect of oil makes it easier for rebels to ﬁnd support and makes
rebellion feasible. Others (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Fearon, 2005) propose that the
oil–violence nexus does not work through conditions of feasibility or ﬁnance
but materializes instead through the weak state mechanism (see also Ross,
2006: 290–291), or that it can be attributed to the effects of ‘sparse networks’
(Humphreys, 2005).
The ‘oil curse’ has been increasingly questioned by a number of studies that ﬁnd
less signiﬁcant – or even positive – results. According to Hegre and Sambanis (2006:
531), only oil exports (and not the production of oil or the production and export
of other resources) are marginally linked robustly to low-key armed conﬂict, but
not to civil war. Smith (2004) ﬁnds a positive effect of oil dependence on regime
stability and peace in developing countries. Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2009) also
point to the more positive effects of resources in general, including regime stability
and peace.
More recently, a growing number of studies have argued that the effects of oil on
civil war are conditional: since conditions of oil endowment and production differ
across countries, this variation may explain why some oil-producing and/or
-exporting countries lapse into violence while some do not. Fjelde (2009) ﬁnds that
the interaction of high levels of corruption and appropriable oil wealth reduces
the conﬂict probabilities of a country, by offsetting the destabilizing effect of oil
production. According to Basedau and Lay (2009), oil dependence increases the risk
of civil war onset, creating a U-shaped relationship (see also Ross, 2012: 153),
whereas high levels of abundance – measured in per capita resource revenues –
are seemingly used to buy peace through large-scale distribution and/or the
establishment of a huge and effective security apparatus. Lujala (2010) ﬁnds that
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(though only signiﬁcant at the 10% level) the mode of resource extraction and
its location matter: oil is only linked to civil war onset when produced onshore;
offshore oil production is unrelated to the onset of civil war. Most recently, a
number of studies supported the idea that ethnic exclusion in oil production forms a
particularly risky combination (Hunziker and Cederman, 2012; Wegenast and
Basedau, 2014), speciﬁcally for the onset of secessionist conﬂict (Sorens, 2011).
Given this puzzle, a conditional explanation seems to be the most promising
approach. In the following section, we thus develop a theoretical argument about
what combinations of conditions may explain civil war onset – or its absence – in
oil-endowed countries.
The conditional effects of oil production
‘Oil’ or ‘oil exports’ are, in fact, rather vague concepts. If we want to explain the
variation in civil war onset among oil exporters, it is necessary to engage in a more
ﬁnely grained conceptualization of oil and how its speciﬁc properties make related
causal mechanisms work. As outlined above, the literature discusses a number
of oil conditions – such as abundance, dependence (Basedau and Lay, 2009),
governance of the oil sector (Snyder and Bhavnani, 2005; Luong and Weinthal,
2006), the location and mode of production as well as production type (e.g. Lujala,
2010; Le Billon, 2012), as well as many other factors (see also Humphreys,
2005; Le Billon, 2012; Ross, 2012). Since civil war is deﬁned as an intense armed
conﬂict between the state and segments of its society, it makes sense to consider
speciﬁcally those conditions of oil production that potentially inﬂuence relations
between the state and society. We therefore propose that, ﬁrst, two conditions
of oil in particular make an oil-related conﬂict between state and society very
likely, and, second, that two additional conditions will rather hinder the emergence
of these conﬂicts in the ﬁrst place – or, if present, will ensure that they can be
handled peacefully.2
Oil conditions increasing civil war risk: dependence and location of oil
resources
The ﬁrst condition we expect to create problems is dependence on oil (Collier and
Hoefﬂer, 2004, 2005; Ross, 2012). High(er) dependence on oil3 indicates that oil is
the main source of wealth in a country and will thus involve the state, circumstances
that may have a number of harmful consequences that might directly and indirectly
2 Alternative and additional conditions will be used for robustness checks in the empirical analysis, and
as such are discussed in section 6.
3 More precisely, Collier and Hoefﬂer (2004) use the ratio of primary commodity exports to GDP as an
indicator for wealth, speciﬁcally relating to the opportunity for rebellion. In a latter paper (Collier and
Hoefﬂer, 2005) they again use the same indicator, and associate it rather to the curse of resource revenues –
which is closer to our own understanding of dependence.
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increase the risk of civil war (Collier and Hoefﬂer, 2005; Dunning, 2008; Basedau
and Lay, 2009): First, in an economy dependent on oil, it is more likely that political
and social conﬂict with the state will center around this commodity. The centrality
of oil is likely to raise societal expectations that the government may be unable to
fulﬁll. Additionally, dependence makes countries vulnerable to price shocks in the
world oil market and the other ills of the ‘Dutch Disease’, creating those economic
grievances that make rebellion more likely and feasible. At the same time, depen-
dence on oil fosters a rent-seeking mentality and results in weaker institutions and
governance, which makes governments less capable of reacting to such grievances.
Ceteris paribus, higher dependence is likely to increase civil war risks for a number
of different reasons.
The second condition that we assume to increase conﬂict risks is related to the
physical location of the resources, and how that ‘geography of oil’ affects the rela-
tions between the central state and ethnic or other identity-based groupings.
Secessionist and autonomist conﬂicts – like those in Indonesia (e.g. Aceh) or
Nigeria (Biafra, Niger Delta) illustrate that the location of substantial oil reserves in
regions that are culturally distinct from the country’s center forms a particularly
dangerous combination (e.g. Hunziker and Cederman, 2012; Wegenast and Base-
dau, 2014). Grievances over the distribution of revenues and any negative side
effects – such as environmental damage – aligned along ethnic or other identity lines
facilitate mobilization and provide signiﬁcant incentives for uprising. The risk of
rebellion increases if groups are already aggrieved, politically or otherwise. Both
ethnic identities and grievances can ease the collective and coordination problems
that rebels face (Kalyvas and Kocher, 2007; Ross, 2012). Furthermore, oil may
contribute to ethnic insurgency by supplying the necessary ﬁnancial means for
armed rebellion – or through the generation of popular support that is granted in
expectation of future booty (Kalyvas and Kocher, 2007; Ross, 2012). In sum, we
believe that the overlap of oil production and the settlement areas of the politically
excluded, relevant ethnic groups substantially increases the risk of conﬂict.
Conditions of oil production decreasing civil war risks: abundance and
democracy
The two aforementioned risk conditions explain why conﬂict over oil can emerge.
However, conﬂict does not necessarily mean that a civil war will break out, given at
least two ways of mitigating oil-related conﬂicts. The ﬁrst is directly related to oil
and builds on the theory of the rentier state (Luciani, 1987), which has been largely
disregarded in the debate over the resource–conﬂict link. The literature has now
acknowledged that a high degree of abundance in oil will reduce the risk of conﬂict.
It has to be stressed that a country’s resource dependence and abundance are not
identical (Soysa, 2002: 8–9; Ross, 2006: 266). Dependence means that the rents
from natural resources are the most important source of income relative to other
value-adding activities, whereas abundance or wealth refers to the absolute resource
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rents available (in per capita terms, or relative to global reserves or production).
A number of recent studies (e.g. Basedau and Lay, 2009; Ross, 2012), as well as
evidence from very rich oil Emirates in the Persian Gulf, have implied that govern-
ments can use high per capita revenues from oil to buy peace. Regimes can offset
oil-related or other conﬂict risks by generous and large-scale distributional policies,
and as a result grievances are unlikely to emerge publicly. A huge security sector,
fueled by oil money, also helps to render rebellion virtually impossible.
The second condition looks beyond the material foundations of peace and relates to
how governments structurally manage conﬂict between the state and society.
We believe that regime type matters in this regard. Arguably, democracies are not only
superior in their ability to create legitimacy but constitute, in essence, a more effective
procedural arrangement by which to resolve conﬂict peacefully. In Sir Karl Popper’s
famous words, ‘democracy is a political system in which the government can be
removedwithout violence’.4We do not necessarily intend to suggest that democracy in
itself represents one particularmechanism bywhich civil war onset can be avoided, but
argue that democracy might have a conditional effect on whether or not governments
are able to deal with oil-related risks. We expect speciﬁcally that, ceteris paribus,
democratic countries will ﬁnd more legitimate and effective – and peaceful – ways to
tackle any grievances that arise. Nationwide or regional problems can thus therein be
voiced and addressed without the need to resort to violence.
Against the backdrop of this discussion, we hypothesize that two conditions will
make countries more prone to civil war while two others are able to mitigate these
conﬂict risks. Speciﬁcally we expect:
H1a: High dependence on oil creates civil war risks through, for instance, price
shocks and other elements of the ‘resource curse’.
H1b: Oil production in settlement areas of politically excluded ethnic groups
create civil war risks by spurring conﬂict over the distribution of oil and its
revenues or the negative externalities of production.
H2a: These conﬂict risks will not materialize when the country can buy peace
through abundant per capita revenues from oil.
H2b: These risks will not materialize when the country has developed democratic
institutions,which are able to channel conﬂicts toward peaceful political solutions.
Method and operationalization
csQCA
In our empirical analysis, we use QCA which is particularly well-suited to test our
conditional theoretical expectations. QCA belongs to a cluster of formal
4 As cited in Cranston (1954: 112).
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conﬁgurational data analysis techniques that are ‘concerned with the systematic
matching and contrasting of cases to establish common causal relationships by
eliminating other possibilities’ (Berg-Schlosser et al., 2009: 2). Introduced by the
sociologist Charles Ragin (1987) during the late 1980s, and developed further over
the last two decades (e.g. Ragin, 2008), QCA techniques have become a useful
complement to the prevailing approaches within macro-comparative research
(Mahoney, 2010). To the best of our knowledge, QCA has rarely been used as a
comparative technique within the ﬁeld of peace and conﬂict studies.5
QCA combines some of the advantages of qualitative (case-oriented) and quanti-
tative (variable-oriented) techniques. It is better suited to the comparison of an
intermediate number of cases (medium-N) than most quantitative or qualitative
techniques are. As a supplement to the quantitative methods dominant in civil war
research, QCA adds two interesting dimensions: ﬁrst, the ability to unravel causally
complex structures like equiﬁnality,6 multiﬁnality,7 and asymmetric causality8
(Grofman and Schneider, 2009: 662), and, second, the ability to identify combi-
nations of conditions (Ragin, 2008: 176–189). Both dimensions ﬁt very well with
our theoretical expectations that oil may or may not lead to civil war depending on
particular conditions, and the combinations thereof.
As a data analysis technique, QCA combines the principles of the ‘method of
agreement’ and the ‘method of difference’ (Berg-Schlosser et al., 2009: 2) – the
two famous principles of J. S. Mill’s logic of comparison – used in order to identify
necessary9 and sufﬁcient10 conditions, or combinations of conditions, in relation to a
certain outcome. Using QCA, Boolean minimization reduces the empirical complexity.
In the words of Charles Ragin, ‘if two Boolean expressions differ in only one causal
condition yet produce the same outcome, then the causal condition that distinguishes
the two expressions can be considered irrelevant and can be removed to create a sim-
pler, combined expression’ (Ragin, 1987: 93). As a result of this Booleanminimization,
more parsimonious combinations of conditions are created that together form a sufﬁ-
cient condition for the occurrence of the outcome (Rihoux andDeMeur, 2009: 34–39).
As part of these combinations of conditions, the initial single condition operates as an
INUS factor (an insufﬁcient but necessary part of a condition that is itself unnecessary
but sufﬁcient for the outcome). INUS conditions are causally relevant factors that are
5 The only other study we know of that has used this technique is Metelits (2008).
6 Equiﬁnality is the idea that the same outcome can result from different causes.
7 Multiﬁnality points to the phenomenon where identical conditions may lead or contribute to different
outcomes.
8 Asymmetric causality means that the explanation for peace is not the logical opposite of the expla-
nation for civil war onset. For instance, if high dependence was a single sufﬁcient condition that explained
the onset of civil war, it is not necessarily the case that low dependence would be a single sufﬁcient condition
that explained peace.
9 A condition is deﬁned as necessary if itmust be present in order for a certain outcome to occur (Ragin,
1987: 99). However, necessary conditions might be present even if the outcome does not occur.
10 A condition is deﬁned as sufﬁcient if by itself it can produce a certain outcome (Ragin, 1987).
Sufﬁcient conditions are not present if the outcome does not occur.
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almost always overlooked when standard statistical techniques are applied (Grofman
and Schneider, 2009: 670, note 4).
There is a consensus among experts on csQCA that a good conﬁgurational ana-
lysis will present at least three technical components (Rihoux and De Meur, 2009;
Schneider and Wagemann, 2010): the truth table, the solution formula and
measures of ﬁt – such as coverage and consistency. The truth table presents the data
to be analyzed, showing the conditions as columns, the cases as rows and the value
of the outcome. However, the cases are not always conﬁned to a single row, but are
rather grouped together if they are associated with a single combination of condi-
tions relating to the same outcome. Using Boolean language, the solution formula
shows the causally relevant conditions linked to the outcome. According to the
current convention, uppercase letters signify the presence of a condition or outcome,
while lowercase letters show the absence or the negation of a condition or outcome.
The + sign points to a logical OR and the * sign to a logical AND (see for more
details Grofman and Schneider, 2009; Schneider and Wagemann, 2010: 414).
Due to the dichotomous nature of our outcome (civil war onset), we decided to use
csQCA as the primary method of data analysis.11There are two main reasons why we
think this decision is appropriate: ﬁrst, the onset of civil war as a historical event comes
very close to the basic premise of csQCA of not having ‘differences in degree’ but of
having rather ‘differences in kind’. Second, to work with a binominal-coded outcome
allows us to use the same data on civil war onset that most of the quantitative literature
has been using to date, and therefore makes our results more directly comparable with
previous research. We will discuss extensively the coding and calibration of these
binominal conditions and the outcome over the course of the following sections.
Sample selection
Our base sample consists of all countries that were net oil exporters for a period of at
least 1 year between 1970 and 2008, the historical timeframe for which reliable data is
available.12To exclude those like Singapore, for instance, who are solely traders of oil,
we also excluded all those countries with no proven reserves of mineral fuels, as
according to the PRIO petroleum dataset.13 Following Ross (2006) and others, we
further reduced our sample size, so as to only retain countries with non-trivial amounts
11 In addition to csQCA, where outcomes as well as conditions are binominally scaled, there are two
other prominent QCA versions that have been used during the last couple of years. In multi-value QCA
(mvQCA), the outcome is binominal and conditions are multi-nominal. In fuzzy-set QCA (fsQCA), both
outcomes and conditions are ordinally scaled within a binominal value range. However, while fsQCA does
not ﬁt to the strict binominal nature of our outcome, we also decided not to use mvQCA since recent
comparative tests have pointed to two potential problems with this technique: ﬁrst, mvQCA may increase
the problem of limited empirical diversity and, second, mvQCA may invoke the introduction of more
difﬁcult counterfactuals. For more details on these points, see Vink and Van Vliet (2009).
12 As a result, we limit the temporal reach of our ﬁndings exclusively to this period.
13 PRIO/CSCW: Petroleum Dataset v. 1.2, online at: http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Geo-
graphical-and-Resource/Petroleum-Dataset/ (accessed 20 April 2010).
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of oil production and revenues.14This two-step sample-selection procedure has left us
with 39 petroleum-producing countries (see Table 1).
Outcome: civil war onset
The outcome of our csQCA is the onset of civil war, which is operationalized
through the use of UCDP/PRIO deﬁnitions and data (Gleditsch et al., 2002).16
According to UCDP/PRIO, an armed conﬂict is a ‘contested incompatibility that
concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two
parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-
related deaths’ per year. We deﬁne a civil war as any armed conﬂict that has caused
at least 1000 battle-related deaths in a given year.We positively coded civilwaronset
for a country when at least one such conﬂict began, or if an ongoing low-intensity
Table 1. Sample
Algeria Iran, Islamic Rep. Syria
Angola Iraq Trinidad and Tobago
Argentina Kazakhstan Tunisia
Australia Kuwait Turkmenistan
Azerbaijan Libya United Arab Emirates
Bahrain Malaysia United Kingdom
Bolivia Mexico Venezuela, RB
Brunei Darussalam The Netherlands Vietnam
Canada Nigeria Yemen, Rep.
Congo, Rep. Norway
Denmark Oman
Ecuador Papua New Guinea
Egypt, Arab Rep. Qatar
Gabon Russia
Indonesia Saudi Arabia
Selection criteria: all countries between 1970–2008 with: (1) at least one single year of net
exports of mineral fuels (SITC Rev1 3)15; (2) proven reserves of mineral fuels (crude oil and
natural gas) according to PRIO Petrodata (V1.2.); and, (3) a mean value of at least USD 100 per
capita rents from mineral fuels or at least 5% fuel exports as a share of GDP between 1970 and
2008, or between 1970 and the year before the onset of civil war.
14 In order to be classiﬁed as a net oil exporter, each state needed to fulﬁll at least one of two conditions:
to have more than USD 100 per capita in rents per year from exporting oil and gas; or, to receive more
than 5% of revenues from oil and gas, as a share of GDP between 1970 and 2008 (or until the ﬁrst onset of
civil war).
15 Data are from the UN comtrade (SITC Rev. 1,33), available online at: http://comtrade.un.org/db/
default.aspx (accessed 6 June 2010).
16 See Appendix I in the supplementary materials for general coding and calibration rules for the
outcome and conditions.
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conﬂict or a new episode of a conﬂict caused 1000 or more battle-related deaths
over the course of 1 year. All other constellations, including those featuring armed
conﬂicts with fewer than 1000 victims, were coded as not experiencing civil war
onset. On this basis, there are 28 cases in our sample that have not experienced civil
war onset and 11 cases in which at least one civil war broke out between 1970
and 2008.
Conditions
According to our theoretical expectations and corresponding to our four hypo-
theses, we limit ourselves to four explanatory conditions: (1) oil dependence, (2) the
overlap of oil reserves and ethnic exclusion, (3) oil abundance, and (4) democracy.
Reducing our approach to four conditions does not mean, however, that we have
completely restricted our analysis only to them. In section 6 we will also discuss and
report the ﬁndings from alternative model speciﬁcations, which include additional
conditions.17
Dependence. We measure dependence on oil by using the ratio of available fuel
exports to GDP. To minimize endogeneity problems, we use the mean between
1970 and the year before the civil war onset.18 If no civil war began, the mean
for the whole period under investigation is calculated. Because csQCA requires
binary-coded conditions, we had to select a cut-off point. As the setting of thresh-
olds always runs the risk of being arbitrary, we were keen to make a thoroughly
transparent and informed decision. Fixing thresholds by simply using medians or
other arithmetic coefﬁcients is not considered to be an appropriate practice
when using QCA (Rihoux and DeMeur, 2009). Thresholding should be done based
on theoretical considerations, previous ﬁndings and/or signiﬁcant empirical
distributions in the sample. Collier and Hoefﬂer (2004: 574) have identiﬁed the
point of the highest conﬂict risk being at 0.33 dependence on oil. Looking at the
actual distribution of dependence in our sample (see Appendix 2 in the supple-
mentary materials), we ﬁnd that there are a number of cases clustering around the
Collier and Hoefﬂer peak – starting at a level of ~0.15 (indicating that 15% of the
GDP consists of fuel exports). This empirical distribution reassures us that
cases above 0.15 undergo a signiﬁcantly higher risk of civil war onset. All values
below our preferred threshold (0.15) have, therefore, been coded as 0, and all values
equal to and above it as 1 (dependence). In order to test for the margins of
17 These conditions are: the lootability of oil production (onshore vs. offshore), population size, anoc-
racy, outside protection and GDP per capita. For more details on the coding and calibration rules, see
Appendix I in the supplementary materials.
18 Since we are mainly interested in the long-term structural conditions underlying civil war onset, we
did not use alternative ways of calculating the values of our conditions. A major problem in using, for
instance, mean values directly before the onset of civil war is that we would then also need to create similar
and directly comparable time-periods for peaceful cases.
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this decision we engaged in robustness checks with alternative cut-off points (see for
more details section 6).
Overlap. Our second condition captures whether oil reserves and production
are located in areas where ethnic groups that are excluded from political decision
making settle. To measure this overlap, we use PRIO data on the location of oil
reserves and production (Lujala et al., 2005) andmatch them to geo-referenced data
from the Ethnic Power Relations Dataset (see Wucherpfennig et al., 2010).
We positively code for the overlap of ethnic exclusion and resource endowment
(overlap), when overlap between the settlement of an excluded group and oil
location could be identiﬁed within the period of investigation or, in the case of civil
war onset, before the outbreak of civil war.19If the area in which the excluded group
settles is dispersed throughout the entire territory of the state, we do not code this as
an overlap. All other constellations are also rated 0.20
Abundance. We measure abundance in oil and gas by the average of oil and gas
rents per capita between 1970 and the onset of civil war (or, if no war occurs, until
2008). Data on estimated income from these rents comes from theWorld Bank data
on adjusted net savings. For abundance, we also engage in proactive empirical pre-
testing and calibration – identifying a pertinent threshold with regard to how
abundance directly relates to the occurrence of civil war onset on a binominal basis.
We found a cut-off point of approximate USD 500 per capita from rents, above
which no civil war began (see Appendix 3). We believe that the identiﬁcation of a
threshold above which no civil war broke out is already an important ﬁnding in
itself, because it means that we have identiﬁed a set of cases in which the value
of abundance is a necessary condition for civil war onset, as well as a sufﬁcient
condition for peace. We expect this ﬁnding to be conﬁrmed by our subsequent QCA
analysis.21Similar to dependence, all values below the cut-off point have been coded
as 0 and all values equal to and above as 1 (abundance).22 In order to minimize
possible distortions from a speciﬁc threshold of abundance we also employed
alternative cut-off points in our robustness checks (see section 6).
Democracy. Employing the commonly used data source Polity IV (Marshall
et al., 2010), we ﬁx the threshold between more or less democratic countries by
19 Appendix 15 in the supplementarymaterials also informs on the dates of discovery and production start.
20 Because this procedure requires subjective visual assessment, we have performed inter-subjective
coding via a group of three coders working independently of each other. See Appendix 1 for more details.
21 This way of calibrating abundance is by no means tautological. Identifying a threshold by looking at
the empirical distribution of a condition is a legitimate form of binominal condition calibration. We also
believe that it would be extremely odd to not make use of this ﬁnding and instead to choose another, less
empirically fruitful, threshold.
22 See also Appendix 14 in the supplementary materials for a cross-tabulation of cases in order to
demonstrate the difference between dependence and abundance.
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calculating the mean of combined values between 1970 and 2008 – or between 1970
and the onset of civil war (if applicable).23Following the standard procedure as used by
a large number of previous studies, all countries that score higher than 10 on a trans-
formed and combined democracy/autocracy scale are considered to be relatively
democratic and are thus coded as 1. All mean values below 10 are coded as 0, denoting
non-democratic states.24As Polity has been criticized for being a biasedmeasure toward
political violence in the middle of its index (Vreeland, 2008), we also reran our tests
employing alternative measures on the divide between democracy and autocracy.
There were no major changes to our results.25
Empirical analysis
Model and truth table
We use the following csQCA model (1) to test for the necessary and sufﬁcient
conditions of civil war onset and peace:
civilwaronset ¼ f ðdependence; overlap; abundance; democracyÞ (1)
Table 2 shows the truth table based on Model (1) for our sample of
39 oil-exporting countries. There are 16 possible conﬁgurations combining four
binominal conditions (24=16) of which only four (rows 13–16) are not covered by
empirical cases (= logical remainders). Four of the 16 possible conﬁgurations – which
together represent 11 cases – have led to civil war onset. Row 1 shows one conﬁgura-
tion with six countries (Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, the Republic of Congo, Iran, and
Nigeria). A second conﬁguration represents civil war onsets in Indonesia, Iraq, and
Syria. Russia (row 3) and Yemen (row 4) are each part of another, different conﬁg-
uration leading to civil war. Furthermore, there are eight different conﬁgurations –
covering 28 cases in which no civil war broke out between 1970 and 2008.26
Identifying the necessary conditions of civil war onset and peace
A condition is deﬁned as necessary if it must be present for a certain outcome to
occur.27
23 For more details, see Appendix 1.
24 It is interesting to note that already at this point anocracy, the most conﬂict-prone regime
type according to previous quantitative research, has been excluded from the core model in our
pre-testing – due to a relatively bad model ﬁt. More details about this procedure are given in
section 6.
25 We recalculated the Polity score according to Vreeland (2008: 407) excluding subdimensions con-
taminated by political violence. See for more details Appendix 1 of our supplementary materials.
26 In addition to Table 2 we provide in Appendix 16 a visualization of the truth table, which comes close
to a four-dimensional cross tabulation of our sample.
27 Ragin (1987: 99). For the tests measuring necessity, we used the fs/QCA 2.5 software, which can be
downloaded at: http://www.u.arizona.edu/ ~ cragin/fsQCA/software.shtml (accessed 18 July 2011).
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Table 2. Truth table: civilwaronset= f (dependence, overlap, abundance democracy)
Row Cases
No. of
cases dependence overlap abundance democracy civilwaronset
Consistency of
civilwaronset= 1
1 Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Congo Rep., Iran,
Nigeria
6 1 1 0 0 1 1.00
2 Indonesia, Iraq, Syria 3 0 1 0 0 1 1.00
3 Russia 1 1 1 0 1 1 1.00
4 Yemen 1 1 0 0 0 1 1.00
5 Gabon, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia 4 1 1 1 0 0 0.00
6 Bahrain, Brunei, Libya, Oman, Qatar,
Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates
7 1 0 1 0 0 0.00
7 Egypt, Tunisia, Vietnam 3 0 0 0 0 0 0.00
8 Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Malaysia, Mexico 5 0 1 0 1 0 0.00
9 Australia, Denmark, The Netherlands, Papua
New Guinea, UK
5 0 0 0 1 0 0.00
10 Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela 2 1 0 1 1 0 0.00
11 Canada 1 0 1 1 1 0 0.00
12 Norway 1 0 0 1 1 0 0.00
13 – 0 1 0 0 1 – –
14 – 0 1 1 1 1 – –
15 – 0 0 1 1 0 – –
16 – 0 0 0 1 0 – –
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There is a single necessary condition for civil war onset, as shown by the consistency
level of 1.00 in Table 3.28As expected, and in line with the ﬁnding of the bivariate pre-
testing, all countries that have experienced a civil war onset feature rents per capita
below USD 500 (abundance). There are in addition two other conditions, which only
marginally fail the test of necessity: the spatial overlap between the settlement of
politically excluded groups and oil reserves and non-democracies (democracy). If
overlap for Yemen had been coded 1, the consistency level29 of OVERLAP would be
1.00 instead of 0.93, indicating a necessary condition. The same is true for democracy
and Russia. If we were to code Russia as completely non-democratic, the absence of
democracy (democracy) would be an additional necessary condition for civil war onset
(consistency value of 1.00 instead of 0.91).
The coverage30 of low abundance as the only necessary condition of civil
war onset lies at 0.46. This means that 46% of the cases that exhibit rents per
capita below USD 500 (low abundance) have experienced civil war onset in
the past.
Unlike in the necessity tests for civil war onset, there is no necessary condition
for peace (the absence of civil war). None of the consistency values reach a value
of 1.00 in Table 4 for the eight different values of the four binominal conditions that
are tested.
Table 3. Results for the necessary conditions tests of
CIVILWARONSET
Conditions tested Consistency Coverage
DEPENDENCE 0.73 0.38
dependence 0.27 0.26
OVERLAP 0.91 0.50
overlap 0.09 0.05
ABUNDANCE 0.00 0.00
abundance 1.00 0.46
DEMOCRACY 0.09 0.07
democracy 0.91 0.42
28 Uppercase letters represent the value 1 for a given binary condition or outcome, whereas lowercase
letters represent the value 0 for that binary condition or outcome. This means that, for instance, ‘ABUN-
DANCE’ represents all cases coded 1 that have an average rent per capita above USD 500, whereas
‘abundance’ represents all cases coded 0 that have an average rent per capita below USD 500.
29 The consistency value of a necessary condition indicates the degree to which this condition overlaps
with a particular outcome relative to all cases with the same outcome. If a given condition is present in all
cases with the same outcome, the consistency value will be 1.00 – indicating that this is a necessary
condition.
30 Coverage of a necessary condition measures the proportion of the outcome that overlaps with the
necessary condition. Only at consistency levels of 100% (1.00) is an interpretation of the coverage coefﬁ-
cients of necessary conditions meaningful. Typically, very low coverage values of necessary conditions
provide evidence for trivial necessary conditions.
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Taken together – on a more technical level – the solution formula for necessary
conditions of civil war onset (2) reads as follows:
abundance CIVILWARONSET (2)
Identifying sufﬁcient and INUS conditions of civil war onset and peace
Tests for sufﬁciency attempt to verify whether or not a single condition always
leads to the same outcome. In addition, sufﬁciency tests in QCA ascertain
whether or not there are jointly sufﬁcient conditions. Each constitutive part
of the phenomenon that might be jointly sufﬁcient is called an INUS condition.
These conditions are insufﬁcient in themselves, but they are necessary parts
of a condition that is itself unnecessary but sufﬁcient for the outcome to occur
(Ragin 2008: 154).
Boolean minimization is used to test for sufﬁcient conditions in relation
to a certain outcome and to seek the most parsimonious solution formula.31
This Boolean operationalization, however, presupposes that each possible
logical conﬁguration is covered by at least one real-world case. Logical remainders,
as logically possible conﬁgurations that are not represented through empirical
cases in the dataset, hinder this quest for parsimony to the extent that they
limit the reliability of the solution formula.32 The parsimonious solution includes
assumptions about logical remainders, while the complex solution does not
include assumptions about logical remainders. Due to the lack of space here,
we present only parsimonious solutions in the following two sections. Complex
solutions are brieﬂy discussed in the respective footnotes, but are more extensively
reported upon in the Supplementary data appendices that form an adjunct to
this paper.
Table 4. Results for the necessary conditions tests of civilwaronset
Conditions tested Consistency Coverage
DEPENDENCE 0.46 0.62
dependence 0.54 0.84
OVERLAP 0.36 0.50
overlap 0.64 0.95
ABUNDANCE 0.54 1.00
abundance 0.46 0.54
DEMOCRACY 0.50 0.94
democracy 0.50 0.58
31 For the following tests of sufﬁciency, the software TOSMANA 1.3.1.0 has been used. See http://
www.tosmana.net (accessed 13 July 2011).
32 There are four logical remainders in our truth table (rows 13, 14, 15, and 16 in Table 2).
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Civil war onset (CIVILWARONSET). A csQCA test for sufﬁciency using the
outcome of civil war onset (CIVILWARONSET), including assumptions about
logical remainders, yields the following parsimonious solution33,34,35:
DEPENDENCE ´ abundance +
OVERLAP ´ abundance ´ democracy +
! CIVILWARONSET ð3Þ
solution coverage: 1.00
solution consistency: 1.00
This parsimonious solution36 (3) points to two distinct – in the language
of QCA, equiﬁnal – pathways that have led to civil war among net oil-exporting
Table 5. Parsimonious solution for civil war onset (Alternative 1), including
assumptions on logical remainders
DEPENDENCE×abundance OVERLAP×abundance × democracy
No. of countries explained 8 9
Countries Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan,
Congo Rep., Iran, Nigeria +
Russia +Yemen
Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Congo
Rep., Iran, Nigeria + Indonesia,
Iraq, Syria
Raw coverage 0.73 0.82
Unique coverage 0.18 0.27
Counterfactual assumptions with regard to logical remainders: DEPENDENCE×overlap ×
abundance ×DEMOCRACY → CIVILWARONSET. This is Conﬁguration 13 in Table 3 of
the truth table.
33 Note that there is a variation in the second term, which substitutes abundance with dependence.
However, we do not report this solution due to the fact that underlying assumptions with regard to logical
remainders are more extensive (see also, Appendix 4). Additionally, the complex solution of the Boolean
minimization for the onset of civil war reads as follows: DEPENDENCE×abundance×democracy+OVER-
LAP×abundance ×democracy+DEPENDENCE×OVERLAP×abundance. See Appendix 5 for more details.
34 The coverage of a solution indicates the proportion of the outcomes that are explained by this
solution; 100% of cases of civil war onset are explained by this solution.
35 The consistency of a solution measures the proportion of all conditions that are part of the solution,
and which overlap with the outcome. In csQCA, the solution consistency is usually 1.00 – indicating that
100% of the value of the solution’s conditions overlap with the outcome.
36 It is important to note that this parsimonious explanation of civil war onset is the result of a
computer-based simulation with regard to logical remainders. This algorithm systematically compares
different solutions of Boolean minimization, given the assumption that the existing logical remainders
would lead to different outcomes and also given that the solution formula is the most parsimonious. The
solution presented above holds true only if one assumes that Conﬁguration 13 in Table 2 (DEPEN-
DENCE×overlap× abundance ×DEMOCRACY), which is one of four logical remainders in our truth
table, leads to the onset of civil war. From a theoretical perspective, this assumption seems plausible –
therefore it is not a difﬁcult counterfactual – since this conﬁguration points to cases of relatively under-
developed democracies with large populations having a high dependence, and therefore being extremely
stressed by the negative consequences of a dominant resource-exporting sector.
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countries.37 Both pathways give substantial support to our hypothesis that speciﬁc
conditions of oil create civil war risks, particularly when they are not offset by the
presence of mitigating conditions. Table 5 provides an overview with regard to the
country coverage of this solution.
In the ﬁrst pathway, high dependence and low abundance are together a sufﬁcient
explanation of civil war onset among oil-exporting nations. Although we do not
claim that all civil wars within oil exporters are directly over oil, we note that this
pathway is compatible with country speciﬁc evidence. Mostly the impact of oil on
conﬂict-proneness materializes indirectly. In countries such as Algeria and the
Congo, dependence has produced varying problems that rulers were unable to buy
off because they lacked abundant revenues from oil. In the Republic of Congo, a
ﬁerce internal struggle between the incumbent president and his predecessor was
additionally fueled by rivaling external interests over control of the oil reserves and
escalated into conﬂict in 1997 (Englebert and Ron, 2004). Algeria, at ﬁrst glance not
a showcase of oil-induced violence, may illustrate some of the more indirect nega-
tive effects of oil dependence. In the 1980s, falling oil prices led to shrinking oil
revenues and undermined the regime’s ability to quell societal dissatisfaction by
means of redistribution policies. This inability to buy peace did not directly cause
the onset of civil war, however, it contributed to the outbreak of the bloody
Algerian conﬂict – which was rather triggered by the government’s decision to
disclaim the results of the elections, which were won by the Islamist opposition
(Lowi, 2009; Shabafrouz, 2010).
The second pathway leading to civil war features countries in which the settle-
ments of politically excluded identity groups geographically overlap with oil
reserves – but in which neither abundance nor democracy mitigate this major civil
war risk. Pertinent examples for this combination are countries with a secessionist
conﬂict – such as Indonesia, a country with territorial conﬂicts in Aceh and Papua.
Iraq’s problems with Kurds and Sunnis, all of which take place in resource-rich
regions, or Nigeria’s conﬂicts in the oil-rich Niger delta are additional cases that ﬁt
under this categorization (cf. Le Billon, 2012; Ross, 2012).38
37 There is an alternative solution formula to the solution (Alternative 1) we present in formula (3); we
divulge this alternative formula (Alternative 2) in Appendix 4 of the supplementary materials. We prefer the
version presented above over Alternative 2 because the latter assumes two logical remainders (Conﬁgura-
tions 13 and 15 in Table 2) leading to civil war instead of just one (Conﬁguration 13 in Table 2).
38 Please note that a large number of cases – such as Algeria, Angola, the Congo Rep., Iran and
Nigeria – may be explained by both pathways. However, qualitative assessment of the 11 civil war cases (see
Appendix 17 in the supplementarymaterials) suggest that in some cases the overlap of ethnicity and oil may be
rather coincidental. For instance, in Algeria oil resources in the Kabylei are not a plausible cause for the civil
war (Shabafrouz, 2010). However, there is independent conﬁrmation that in most of the cases conﬂicts were
actually directly or indirectly related to oil. According to Rustad and Binningsbø (2012), at least eight out of
the 11 civil war cases in our sample were at least partly fought over natural resources (see again Appendix 17).
We concede that civil wars in Azerbaijan and Syria were only indirectly related to oil. Oil had indirect effects in
both cases through a lack of abundant rents to buy out opponents. In order to avoid undue bias, however, we
have excluded both cases from our sample, and rerun tests for sufﬁciency. Solution formulas from Boolean
minimization remained identical.
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Taken separately, all four conditions in the model are relevant in explaining
the onset of civil war. They form INUS conditions as part of these two
sufﬁcient explanations. The combination of high dependence and low abundance is
relevant in eight out of ten of the civil war cases (73%) and the combination
of overlap, low abundance and no democratic institutions is a possible expla-
nation in nine out of 10 onsets (82%). Six out of the 11 cases conform to both
pathways. We also provide a more qualitative and detailed description of the link
between oil and civil war onset within each country in Appendix 17 of the
supplementary materials.
Peace/no onset of civil war (CIVILWARONSET). After having tested for the
sufﬁcient conditions for civil war onset, formula (4) summarizes the results of the
csQCA test for sufﬁciency using no civil war onset (peace) as an outcome:
ABUNDANCE+
dependence ´ overlap +
dependence ´DEMOCRACY
! civilwaronset ð4Þ
solution coverage: 1.00
solution consistency: 1.00
As indicated by this solution formula, there are three different pathways to
peace in net oil-exporting countries. Table 6 below shows the countries that
are covered by each of the pathways.39 One pathway to peace is displayed by a
single sufﬁcient condition, which mirrors the necessary condition for civil war
identiﬁed above: high abundance from oil rents per capita (ABUNDANCE).
This ﬁnding suggests that once a country has sufﬁcient revenues to buy peace it
will be spared from civil war, regardless of what potential problems related to the
production of oil are present. Unsurprisingly, countries with very high per capita
income from oil – such as countries in the Persian Gulf (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates) or elsewhere (Gabon, Brunei) –
represent this explanation, although they also show one or both of the oil-related
risk conditions.40
The second pathway to peace consists of a combination of low dependence with
no overlap between politically marginalized groups and oil location. In other words,
39 Note that this solution rests on the assumption that three of the previously mentioned logical
remainders – rows 14, 15, and 16 of the truth table in Table 2 – lead to the absence of civil war onset.
However, these logical remainders do not overlap with the logical remainder used to produce the parsi-
monious solution for civil war onset.
40 Note that many of the abundant oil exporters are also countries with a small population size. This
may suggest that it is rather the number of people living in a country that determines a country’s oil
abundance. We believe, however, that small population size only increases the likelihood of high income
from oil. There are a number of more populous countries like Kazhakstan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkmenistan
belonging to the group of oil abundant countries.
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Table 6. Coverage of the parsimonious solution formula for the absence of peace (civilwaronset), including assumptions about
logical remainders
ABUNDANCE dependence × overlap dependence ×DEMOCRACY
No. of countries explained 15 9 12
Countries Bahrain, Brunei, Libya, Oman,
Qatar, Turkmenistan, United
Arab Emirates +Canada +
Gabon, Kazakhstan, Kuwait,
Saudi Arabia +Norway+
Trinidad and Tobago,
Venezuela
Australia, Denmark, The
Netherlands, Papua New
Guinea, United Kingdom+
Egypt, Tunisia, Vietnam+
Norway
Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador,
Malaysia, Mexico +Australia,
Denmark, The Netherlands,
Papua New Guinea, United
Kingdom+Canada +Norway
Raw coverage 0.54 0.32 0.43
Unique coverage 0.46 0.11 0.18
Counterfactual assumptions with regard to logical remainders: DEPENDENCE×OVERLAP×ABUNDANCE×DEMOCRACY+dependence ×
OVERLAP×ABUNDANCE×democracy + dependence × overlap ×ABUNDANCE×democracy → CIVILWARONSET. These are Conﬁgurations
numbers 14, 15, and 16 in Table 2 (truth table).
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in these countries no oil-related conﬂict risks exist at all. It hence seems irrelevant for
the non-occurrence of civil war whether the conﬂict-mitigating conditions of high
abundance and democracy are: completely absent (Egypt, Tunisia, Vietnam),
partly absent (e.g. Papua New Guinea and many Western countries) or fully
present (Norway).
The third pathway highlights the importance of democratic institutions.
Democracy is apparently capable of maintaining peace when dependence is low no
matter whether there is an overlap between ethnic exclusion and oil. Speciﬁcally,
many of the Latin American oil producers illustrate the validity of this ﬁnding.
For instance, in Bolivia protests in relation to the distribution of hydrocarbons
(often located in indigenous territory) have been possible without the necessity of
resorting to major violence. In 2005, President Carlos Mesa resigned in the face of
massive protests and subsequently Evo Morales was elected as the ﬁrst indigenous
president (Perreault, 2008).
All in all, a comparison of 39 oil producers using QCA has largely supported
our four hypotheses. The results presented above, however, allow for more
ﬁnely grained conditional speciﬁcations. First, countries highly dependent on
oil but with low oil abundance per capita will experience civil war. Second,
an overlap of ethnic exclusion with oil reserves leads to intense conﬂict within
non-democratic states, which are unable to buy peace through the redistri-
bution of abundant oil revenues. Among the conﬂict-mitigating conditions,
high oil abundance eradicates conﬂict risks, regardless of their number and
presence. Democracy plays a somewhat less prominent role, but mitigates civil
war risks particularly when ethnicity and oil overlap and when oil dependence
is rather low.
Discussion of model speciﬁcations
How trustworthy are our results? Discussions of tests for robustness of QCA results
are rare. Only Skaaning (2011) has provided some ideas about how to test the
validity of ﬁndings, using Boolean algebra.We thus follow his advice, and have used
two strategies to strengthen conﬁdence in our results. We ﬁrst modify our QCA
model by incorporating additional conditions and/or replacing existing ones with
others. Second, we replicate our QCA analysis and concentrate on our preferred
model, by changing thresholds of dependence, abundance, and democracy – three
of the dichotomous conditions we have used.
We also perform a large number of alternative QCA tests, including at least
ﬁve additional theoretically relevant conditions: lootability of oil,41 anocracy,42
41 Lujala (2010) ﬁnds that the mode of extraction and its lootability matter: oil is only positively linked
to civil war onset when produced onshore; offshore oil production is unrelated to civil war onset.
42 The debate about the link between democracy and civil war has found that hybrid regimes are most
conﬂict prone (Hegre et al., 2001), though this result has since been contested (Vreeland, 2008).
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population size,43 outside protection,44 and GDP per capita.45 We run csQCA
tests for all possible combinations of altogether nine different dichotomous condi-
tions, looking at two aspects that indicate a csQCA model is appropriate: ﬁrst, the
elimination of contradictions and, second, the number of logical remainders. Based
on the analytical logic of QCA, there is a certain trade-off between the number of
conditions included in the model and the number of potential logical remainders,
given the constant number of historical cases. The more binary-coded conditions,
the exponentially higher the number of theoretically possible conﬁgurations. Given
the usually static number of historical cases, it is imperative then that the number of
logical remainders – conﬁgurations not represented by empirical cases – increases as
well. This complicates the interpretation of results, and increases the need to use
more simplifying assumptions (counterfactuals) in order to be able to identify
the most parsimonious solutions. Therefore, it is usually suggested to calibrate
QCA models so as to have a lesser number of contradictory cases on the one hand
combined with less logical remainders on the other, given a constant number of
empirical cases.
When including all ﬁve additional conditions mentioned above, it turned out that
there is no other combination of four or less conditions that is in line with
the outcome without producing zero contradictory cases, even though there are
combinations of conditions that produce parsimonious solutions with a lower
number of assumptions about logical remainders.46 Therefore, we believe that
solutions as presented in this paper provide the most parsimonious solution, given a
number of important alternative conditions.47
As a second strategy, we extensively test the effects of changing thresholds for
three of our four dichotomous conditions.48 We independently change thresholds
for dependence, abundance, and democracy. Overall, our reported results are
extremely stable. We report these tests in Appendices 8–13 of the Supplementary
data. If one changes the threshold for dependence to between 10% and 30% of
rent revenues, solutions for the onset of civil war do not change – even though
Egypt, Tunisia, Vietnam, and Yemen move into the same conﬁguration, producing
contradictory cases if one sets the degree of dependence above the value of Yemen
(0.2988). However, this has some additional consequences for the solution on the
outcome peace. If the degree of dependence is above the mean level for Yemen, the
43 Hegre and Sambanis (2006) have empirically identiﬁed population size as a robust correlate of civil
war (also Dixon, 2009).
44 The presence of outside forces, for instance, is believed to decrease the opportunity for rebellion
(Basedau and Lay, 2009).
45 Income level is generally to be believed to work as a mitigating condition for conﬂict risk (e.g. Hegre
and Sambanis, 2006; Dixon, 2009).
46 An overview of these tests is available from the authors upon request.
47 For instance, a model that includes dependence, overlap, abundance, and anocracy leads to four cases
in a contradictory conﬁguration, including one logical remainder.
48 Please note that, as such, overlap is a binary concept.
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solution path that combines low dependence and no overlap in formula (4)
is omitted – due to the emerging conﬁguration with contradictory cases
mentioned above.
Moving the threshold of abundance between the values for Algeria (395.95) and
Canada (652.49) does not signiﬁcantly challenge our ﬁndings. However, it leads to
the fall of a number of different cases into contradictory conﬁgurations, but neither
of the two pathways for civil war onset nor our three explanations for peace
disappeared. Russia is the only case that is sensitive to changes in the threshold of
abundance to the levels that we have tested. Moving the threshold of abundance
up and down, Russia appears as a single case in an additional third pathway
corresponding to the onset of civil war.49 This pathway includes high dependence,
overlap and democracy (for more details, see Appendix 10). However, all of the
other explanatory pathways remain stable and valid.
While using the alternative speciﬁcation of Polity not contaminated by political
violence as suggested by Vreeland (2008) does not substantially alter our results,
changes in the threshold for democracy have perhaps the most wide-ranging effect.
Solutions for the onset of civil war remain stable when moving the threshold of
the policy index further down, but the second part of the parsimonious solution
formula (3), as presented above, becomes omitted if one sets the cut-off point for
democracy above the value ofMexico, which is at 10.7. The ﬁrst pathway, signaling
that high dependence and low abundance are jointly sufﬁcient conditions for civil
war, remains uncontested. It is interesting to note that a changing threshold for
democracy has no effect on the solution formula for peace, while it simply leads to
the fall of some cases into a contradictory conﬁguration.We interpret this sensitivity
as a further indication that – especially within non-democracies with extremely low
levels of political pluralism – the geographical overlap of oil with politically exclu-
ded identity groups leads to civil war, while there is little doubt that a high quality of
democracy helps to mitigate the risk of civil conﬂict.
Conclusion
We have argued that civil war risks in oil-exporting countries are contingent on
speciﬁc conditions of oil production and how they structure state–society relations.
Speciﬁcally, we have hypothesized that states either highly dependent on oil or
with problematic relations to oil regions are prone to civil war. However, these
risks will be mitigated when state institutions are democratic and can manage
conﬂicts peacefully, or when governments use abundant oil revenues to buy peace.
Methodologically, we have used QCA as a comparative technique, one that is
particularly devised to test for complex conditional relationships in medium-N
samples. Results largely conﬁrm our hypotheses, and remain stable in a number of
49 For more details, see Appendix 9.
570 MATTH IA S BA SEDAU AND THOMAS R ICHTER
model speciﬁcations that include alternative conditions and different thresholds.
We believe, therefore, that our ﬁndings advance the debate about the link between
natural resources and civil war in a number of different ways:
First, we have strong empirical indications of a conditional explanation of the
oil–conﬂict link. Our results reveal that there is no one single mechanism that links
oil to civil war. It is not oil as such – or a single operationalization – that creates this
relationship, but rather certain combinations of oil-related (and other) conditions in
a country.
Second, with this conditional explanation in mind, we underscore the ambiguous
nature of oil production, depending on the mix of conﬂict risks and mitigating
aspects. Questioning the popular notion that ‘oil abundance’ is a major determinant
of civil war onset, we found – already at the stage of pre-testing – that low abun-
dance is a necessary condition for civil war onset (see also Smith, 2004). This ﬁnding
provides evidence for the relevance of peace-buying mechanisms, which require a
certain amount of income from oil – as suggested by the rentier state approach.
When available at and above a certain level, abundance substantially reduces – if
not eradicates completely – oil-related civil war risks.
Third, our results reveal that there are several simultaneous pathways that lead to
civil war and peace, which strongly points to the equiﬁnal nature of the underlying
problem. High dependence and low abundance are each an INUS condition, which
jointly are able to explain the onset of civil war for over 70% of the relevant cases –
indicating that they are a particularly risky combination.50This pathway shows that
oil is frequently a more indirect cause of violent conﬂict: dependence on oil makes
countries vulnerable to the ills of the ‘resource curse’, such as adverse effects on
institutional quality and the economy when windfalls from oil fail to materialize.
The second pathway leading to civil war within oil-exporting countries connects the
properties of oil to the political regime and inter-ethnic relations: non-democratic
oil regimes suffer from civil war if politically excluded groups settle in oil territories
and there are no abundant oil revenues at the government’s disposal. Unsurpris-
ingly, many of the countries showing this conﬁguration (such as Indonesia, Iran,
and Nigeria) have experienced secessionist conﬂicts. Theoretically, this ﬁnding
supports our expectation that, contingent on the oil money (un)availability, non-
democratic regimes are able to deal less successfully with conﬂict risks that emerge
from identity- and resource-based problems.
Unlike most of the quantitative literature on civil war, we were also able to specify
the explanations for peace, deﬁned here as the non-occurrence of civil war. Inter-
estingly, we have found no necessary conditions for peace, and the sufﬁcient
conditions for peace do not simply take the opposite values of our explanations for
civil war. Altogether, we have identiﬁed three pathways that may sufﬁciently
explain the non-occurrence of civil war: (1) high abundance of oil – underscoring
50 To the best of our knowledge, there has been only one single scholarly contribution to date that
makes a similar argument (see Basedau and Lay, 2009).
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the peace-buying mechanisms within countries with oil-related risks; (2) low
dependence and overlap not being present – indicating that the absence of both risk
conditions will lead to the avoidance of civil war; and, (3) low dependence and
democracy – pointing to the mitigating function performed by democratic institu-
tions if ethnic exclusion overlaps with oil reserves at the local level.
Taken together, our explanations constitute a key contribution to the literature
on civil war onset: wars in oil producing countries are evidently not determined by a
single condition and thus there are different conditional pathways that lead to
them. The same is also true for sustaining peace, where our results highlight
the important role that peace-buying mechanisms play. Our ﬁndings also leave
much room for additional work. Further research will need, for instance, to focus
particularly on the question of whether or not there are also equiﬁnal pathways
that lead to either civil war or peace among the net exporters of other natural
resources. It also seems pertinent and equally important for future scholarship
to trace – on the basis of in-depth comparative case studies – a more detailed
understanding of the functioning of the mechanisms that lie behind the different
pathways that we have identiﬁed. This will possibly also include additional con-
textual conditions not directly relating to oil. Although our hypotheses, the testing
of up to nine different conditions and the robustness checks consider many non-oil
speciﬁc aspects such as ethnicity, income level, or population size, we cannot
completely preclude that other conditions will contribute to the explanation of
single cases. In combination with the ﬁndings presented here, such literature
would undoubtedly help to further the overarching scholarly ambition of better
comprehending – and hence eventually minimizing, if not eradicating – natural
resource-related violence.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank André Bank, Tobias Böhmelt, Jörg Friedrichs,
Bert Hoffmann, Michael Ross, Philippe Schmitter, and Claudius Wagemann
as well as the anonymous reviewers of the journal for their insightful comments
and productive criticism. They are also very grateful to Georg Strüver and
Hannes Bahrenburg for their excellent research assistance. Research for this
article was generously funded by the German Research Foundation as part
of the projects ‘A Dangerous Liaison? Ethnicity, Natural Resources and
Civil Conﬂict Onset’, ‘Is Resource Wealth A Risk Factor?’ (both directed by
Matthias Basedau) and ‘Stability and Change of Authoritarian Regimes’ (directed
by Thomas Richter).
Supplementary material
To view supplementary materials for this article, please visit http://dx.doi.org/
10.1017/S1755773913000234.
572 MATTH IA S BA SEDAU AND THOMAS R ICHTER
References
Basedau,M. and J. Lay (2009), ‘Resource curse or rentier peace? The ambigious effects of oil wealth and oil
dependence on violent conﬂict’, Journal of Peace Research 46(6): 757–776.
Berg-Schlosser, D., G. De Meur, B. Rihoux and C.C. Ragin (2009), ‘Qualitative Comparative Analysis
(QCA) as an approach’, in Rihoux B. and Ragin C.C. (eds), Conﬁgurational Comparative Methods,
London: Sage, pp. 1–18.
Le Billon, P. (2008), ‘Diamond wars? Conﬂict diamonds and geographies of resource wars’, Annals of the
Association of American Geographers 98(2): 345–372.
Le Billon, P. (2012),Wars of Plunder: Conﬂicts, Proﬁts and the Politics of Resources, London: C Hurst &
Co Publishers Ltd.
Brunnschweiler, C.N. and E.H. Bulte (2009), ‘Natural resources and violent conﬂict: resource abundance,
dependence, and the onset of civil wars’,Oxford Economic Papers 61(4): 651–674.
Collier, P. and A. Hoefﬂer (2004), ‘Greed and grievance in civil war’,Oxford Economic Papers 56(4): 563–595.
Collier, P. and A. Hoefﬂer (2005), ‘Resource rents, governance, and conﬂict’, Journal of Conﬂict Resolution
49(4): 625–633.
Cranston, M.W. (1954), Freedom: A New Analysis, London: Longmans, Green.
Dixon, J. (2009), ‘What causes civil wars? Integrating quantitative research ﬁndings’, International Studies
Review 11(4): 707–735.
Dunning, T. (2008), Crude Democracy: Natural Resource Wealth and Political Regimes, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Englebert, P. and J. Ron (2004), ‘Primary commodities and war: Congo-Brazzaville’s ambivalent
resource curse’, Comparative Politics 37(1): 61–81.
Fearon, J.D. and D.D. Laitin (2003), ‘Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war’, American Political Science
Review 97(1): 75–90.
Fearon, J.D. (2005), ‘Primary commodities exports and civil war’, Journal of Conﬂict Resolution 49(4):
483–507.
Fjelde, H. (2009), ‘Buying peace? Oil wealth, corruption and civil war, 1985–99’, Journal of Peace Research
46(2): 199–218.
Gleditsch, N.P., P. Wallensteen and M. Eriksson (2002), ‘Armed conﬂict 1946–2001: a new dataset’,
Journal of Peace Research 39(5): 615–637.
Grofman, B. and C.Q. Schneider (2009), ‘An introduction to crisp set QCA, with a comparison to binary
logistic regression’, Political Research Quarterly 62(4): 662–672.
Hegre, H., T. Ellingsen, S. Gates and N.P. Gleditsch (2001), ‘Toward a democratic civil peace? Democracy,
political change, and civil war’, American Political Science Review 95(1): 33–48.
Hegre, H. and N. Sambanis (2006), ‘Sensitivity analysis of empirical results on civil war onset’, Journal of
Conﬂict Resolution 50(4): 508–535.
Humphreys, M. (2005), ‘Natural resources, conﬂict, and conﬂict resolution – uncovering the mechanisms’,
Journal of Conﬂict Resolution 49(4): 508–537.
Hunziker, P. and L.-E. Cederman (2012), ‘No extraction without representation’, Petroleum Production
and Ethnonationalist Conﬂict, New Orleans.
Indra De, S. (2002), ‘Paradise is a bazaar? Greed, creed, and governance in civil war, 1989–99’, Journal of
Peace Research 39(4): 395–416.
Kalyvas, S.N. and M.A. Kocher (2007), ‘How ‘Free’ is free riding in civil wars?: Violence, insurgency, and
the collective action problem’,World Politics 59(2): 177–216.
Lowi, M.R. (2009), Oil wealth and the poverty of politics: Algeria compared, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Luciani, G. (1987), ‘Allocation vs. production state’, in Beblawi H. and Luciani G. (eds), The Rentier State,
London: Croom Helm, pp. 63–84.
Lujala, P., N.P. Gleditsch and E. Gilmore (2005), ‘A diamond curse? Civil war and a lootable resource’,
Journal of Conﬂict Resolution 49(4): 538–562.
Lujala, P. (2010), ‘The spoils of nature: armed civil conﬂict and rebel access to natural resources’, Journal of
Peace Research 47(1): 15–28.
Why do some oil exporters experience civil war but others do not? 573
Luong, P.J. and E. Weinthal (2006), ‘Rethinking the resource curse: ownership, structure, institutional
capacity, and domestic constraints’, Annual Review of Political Science 9: 241–263.
Mahoney, J. (2010), ‘After KKV: the new methodology of qualitative research’, World Politics 62(1):
120–147.
Marshall, M.G., T.R. Gurr and K. Jaggers (2010), ‘Polity IV Project: Dataset Users’ Manual, Arlington,
VA/Severn, MD: Center for Systemic Peace, http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm
(accessed 30 January 2011).
Metelits, C.M. (2008), ‘The consequences of rivalry: explaining insurgent violence using fuzzy sets’,
Political Research Quarterly 62(4): 673–684.
Perreault, T. (2008),Natural Gas, Indigenous Mobilization and the Bolivian State, Geneva: United Nations
Research Institute for Social Development. http://www.unrisd.org/unrisd/website/document.
nsf/70870613ae33162380256b5a004d932e/f270e0c066f3de7780256b67005b728c/$FILE/dp114.
pdf (accessed 28 August 2012).
Ragin, C.C. (1987), The comparative method moving beyond qualitative and quantitative strategies,
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Ragin, C.C. (2008),Redesigning Social Inquiry: Fuzzy Sets and Beyond, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago
Press.
Rihoux, B. and G. De Meur (2009), ‘Crisp-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (csQCA)’, in Rihoux B.
and Ragin C.C. (eds), Conﬁgurational Comparative Methods, London: Sage, pp. 33–68.
Ross, M.L. (2004a), ‘What do we know about natural resources and civil war?’, Journal of Peace Research
41(3): 337–356.
Ross, M.L. (2004b), ‘How do natural resource inﬂuence civil war? Evidence from thirteen cases’, Inter-
national Organization 58(1): 35–67.
Ross, M.L. (2006), ‘A closer look at oil, diamonds, and civil war’, Annual Review of Political Science 9(1):
265–300.
Ross, M.L. (2012), The Oil Curse: How PetroleumWealth Shapes the Development of Nations, Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Rustad, S.A. and H.M. Binningsbø (2012), ‘A price worth ﬁghting for? Natural resources and conﬂict
recurrence’, Journal of Peace Research 49(4): 531–546.
Schneider, C.Q. and C. Wagemann (2010), ‘Standards of good practice in Qualitative Comparative
Analysis (QCA) and fuzzy-sets’, Comparative Sociology 9(3): 397–418.
Shabafrouz, M. (2010), Fuel for Conﬂict or Balm for Peace? Assessing the Effects of Hydrocarbons on
Peace Efforts in Algeria GIGA Working Paper, 132, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area
Studies http://ideas.repec.org/p/gig/wpaper/132.html (accessed 12 May 2011).
Skaaning, S.-E. (2011), ‘Assessing the robustness of crisp-set and fuzzy-set QCA results’, Sociological
Methods & Research 40(2): 391–408.
Smith, B. (2004), ‘Oil wealth and regime survival in the developing world, 1960–1999’, American Journal
of Political Science 48(2): 232–246.
Snyder, R. and R. Bhavnani (2005), ‘Diamonds, blood, and taxes – a revenue-centered framework for
explaining political order’, Journal of Conﬂict Resolution 49(4): 563–597.
Sorens, J. (2011), ‘Mineral production, territory, and ethnic rebellion: the role of rebel constituencies’,
Journal of Peace Research 48(5): 571–585.
Vink, M.P. and O. Van Vliet (2009), ‘Not quite crisp not yet fuzzy? Assessing the potentials and pitfalls of
multi-value QCA’, Field Methods 21(3): 265–289.
Vreeland, J.R. (2008), ‘The effect of political regime on civil war: unpacking anocracy’, Journal of Conﬂict
Resolution 52(3): 401–425.
Wegenast, T. and M. Basedau (2014), ‘Ethnic fractionalization, natural resources and armed conﬂict’,
Conﬂict Management and Peace Science (forthcoming).
Wucherpfennig, J., N.B. Weidmann, L.-E. Cederman, L. Girardin, P. Duhart, G. Brown, J. Flora
and A. Wimmer (2010), ‘GeoEPR dataset’, http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/epr/faces/study/
StudyPage.xhtml?studyId=36582&studyListingIndex=2_67abddb8f445c0f8c8711029cd65 (accessed
31 January 2011).
574 MATTH IA S BA SEDAU AND THOMAS R ICHTER
